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Abstract 
Self-authorship has been established as the basis of an influential liberal 
principle of legislation and public policy. Being the author of one’s own 
life is a significant component of one’s own well-being, and therefore, is 
better understood from the viewpoint of the person whose life it is. 
However, most philosophical accounts, including Raz’s conception of 
self-authorship, rely on general and abstract principles rather than specific 
individual psychological properties of the person whose life it is. We 
elaborate on the principles of self-authorship on the basis of Self-
Determination Theory, an empirically-based psychological theory that has 
been at the forefront of the study of autonomy and self-authorship for 
more than 45 years. Our account transcends distinctions between positive 
and negative freedom and attempts to pinpoint the exact properties of self-
authorship within the psychological processes of intrinsic motivation and 
internalization. If a primary objective of public policy is to support self-
authorship, then it should be devised on the basis of how intrinsic 
motivation and internalization can be properly supported. Self-
Determination Theory identifies three basic psychological needs: 
autonomy, competence and relatedness. The satisfaction of these needs is 
associated with the support and growth of intrinsic tendencies and the 
advancement of well-being. Through this analysis, we can properly 
evaluate the significance of rationality, basic goods and the availability of 
options to self-authorship. Implications for law and policy are discussed 
with an emphasis on legal paternalism and what many theorists call 
“liberal perfectionism”, that is, the non-coercive support and promotion of 
the good life. 
Keywords: self-determination theory; self-authorship; autonomy; 
well-being; liberalism; paternalism; perfectionism 
 
  
1. Introduction 
A good life can be seen as something of obvious value: it is a fundamental pursuit 
for individuals and a central goal for government policy. At the same time, there 
are different ways to approach it. Rigidly perfectionist understandings of well-
being focus on the advancement of perfection for all humans as the most 
desirable political goal (Hurka, 1993), even conceding that some “coercive 
discouragement” is justified when their objectively defined well-being is 
threatened (Finnis, 1987). Less demanding (and more pluralist) accounts focus 
on the life that is good and fulfilling for the person whose life it is. In this context, 
well-being is a prudential value: it does not have the aesthetic value of a 
splendid work of art or the moral value of an act of mercy. The fact that such a 
work of art has aesthetic value or the conviction that being merciful to others is a 
moral virtue does not necessarily entail that either of them is good for me. Many 
liberals have subscribed to this less demanding view (often labeled “liberal 
perfectionism”), which explicitly rejects the more traditional liberal idea that the 
state should be neutral toward the good life and never adopt policies on these 
perfectionist grounds. Proponents of political neutrality include Ronald Dworkin 
(1978), Bruce Ackerman (1980), Charles Larmore (1987), Gerald Gaus (1996), 
and John Rawls (1993). 
Despite a strong focus on well-being, liberal perfectionism will not 
advocate the view that people should be forced in any way to lead good lives. 
Since people are more likely to lead lives that are valuable for them if they are 
allowed to fashion their lives according to their own views, tastes, and 
convictions, the good life is associated with autonomous living. There is a 
strong subjective element in this understanding of personal well-being, despite 
 
 
the fact that it does not require or entail any form of moral subjectivism. 
Lifestyles can be objectively good or bad, but, generally speaking, a good life 
cannot be (at least entirely) dictated from the outside, it cannot be fundamentally 
alien to the person whose life it is. For liberals, this idea is encapsulated in Mill’s 
harm principle (Mill, 1974), which is, simply put, a rule of thumb to be followed 
by governments that wish to allow their citizens enough room for 
autonomously shaping their own lives—a kind of freedom also known as self-
authorship. The Millian assumption is that, at least in   principle, 
freedom takes priority in all moral and political questions. In The Subjection of 
Women, Mill—an ardent utilitarian with no consideration for “abstract rights”— 
wrote that “in practical matters, the burden of proof is supposed to be with those 
who are against liberty” (2010, p. 257). This is an intuition that most people seem 
to share, at least when contemplating self-authorship in the autonomy-oriented 
Western world—although the distinction between the West and the rest of the 
world in this context faces powerful criticism (Nussbaum, 2002). 
The focus on self-authorship, however, is not an exclusively utilitarian or 
consequentialist project. Most theorists who discuss freedom, regardless of their 
final neutralist or perfectionist prescriptions, seem to initially associate it with 
the autonomous shaping of one’s own life. Of course, Mill is known for 
defending the view that personal autonomy (although he never used the term) 
is essential for the maximization of happiness, but other influential theorists 
offer conceptions of autonomy that depart from Mill’s utilitarian approach. John 
Rawls, for example, constructed a theory of justice with the image of the 
autonomous person in mind, a  
person who desires above all to set and pursue her own plans in life (Rawls, 1971). 
Ronald Dworkin, in his earlier writings, speaks of the autonomy of adult citizens 
 as the “right to make decisions about the character of their lives themselves” 
(1986, p. 5). Variations of this view have been offered by theorists who understand 
themselves as liberals both in the direction of a more demanding “principle of 
restraint” in government interference and in an effort to highlight the importance 
of positive freedom. The former strategy is most notably followed by philosophers 
who subscribe to Locke’s views on what we often call “self-ownership” or “self-
sovereignty” as well as by Kantians and even Millians like Joel Feinberg. The 
latter task was most notably undertaken by Joseph Raz, who advocated a 
perfectionist account of personal autonomy as self-authorship (Raz, 1986). 
In this article, we intend to explore the notion of self-authorship in terms of 
both content and value. Despite the ever-growing literature on personal autonomy 
and self-authorship, the notion remains elusive, partly due to Raz’s own heavily 
theoretical approach. The celebrated ideal of personal autonomy as self-authorship 
owes much of its intuitive appeal to an equally intuitively appealing hint about 
the workings of the human psyche and mind. In what follows, we will attempt to 
flesh out this intuition drawing on the findings and principles of self-determination 
theory (SDT). Before the end, we will have provided a more concrete account of 
self-authorship’s content and value as well as a clear picture of its importance for 
personal well-being and public policy. We will conclude with a discussion of the 
role law is expected to play in light of the preceding analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. What new does a psychological theory bring into the account of 
self- authorship? 
2.1. The psychological perspective of self-determination theory 
To understand self-authorship, it is necessary to focus on the life that is good and 
fulfilling for the person whose life it is. It would surely make sense to adopt a 
psychological approach that aims to understand human behavior from the lens of 
the individual. This approach is quite different from the philosophical 
discussion of autonomy that was briefly outlined above, the primary goal of 
which is to unravel the properties of autonomy through logical argumentation. 
Psychology takes a different stand. Argumentation is still present, especially in 
the construction of hypotheses. However, hypotheses serve as mere starting 
points. Psychology is devoted to testing these hypotheses in an empirical manner 
rather than arguing in favor or against them. Laboratory or field experiments and 
observational and correlational studies aim at establishing whether the 
researchers’ ideas are valid. Even the simplest and most intuitively appealing 
ideas can be disconfirmed through the empirical method. Much may be said 
about the validity of this method, but that is how empirical psychology—the 
greater part of psychology—works. 
Self-determination theory is an empirically based psychological theory. What 
it has to say about autonomy and self-authorship is primarily based on actual
 empirical data collected in the laboratory and the field. For instance, in a now 
classic experiment, Deci (1971) tested the effect of rewarding participants for an 
intrinsically motivating activity such as playing with a puzzle. Intuitively, someone 
might presume that adding an external positive reinforcement would increase 
participants’ motivation to play with the puzzle. In fact, it had the opposite effect: 
it decreased participants’ intrinsic motivation. In this sense, interfering with an 
individuals’ autonomy, even if it is in the form of rewards, can undermine the 
expression of natural, intrinsic tendencies. From Deci’s (1971) pioneering work 
to this day, self-determination theory has examined the interaction between the 
environment and people’s natural tendencies and has grown in a variety of fields 
such as education (Ryan & Deci, 2000), psychotherapy (Ryan & Deci, 2008), 
organizations (Gagné & Bhave, 2011), physical activity and exercise (Van de 
Berghe, Vansteenkiste, Cardon, Kirk, & Haerens, 2014), and video games (Rigby 
& Ryan, 2011). 
 
2.2. Self-determination theory is an organismic theory 
The interaction between person and environment was exemplified in the work of 
Lewin (1946), often taking the form of the axiomatic equation B = f(P,E) (behavior 
is a function of the person and the environment). Different scientific 
perspectives choose to focus on different aspects of this dynamic approach to 
behavior. Behaviorists, for example, choose to focus more on the physical 
environment. Famous behaviorist B.F Skinner argued that, “As we learn more 
about the effects of the environment, we have less reason to attribute any part of 
human behavior to an autonomous controlling agent” (1971, p. 101). Skinner 
thought that all internal states, including autonomy, have no real use in 
 
 
understanding human behavior. On the other hand, other traditions in 
psychology choose to focus less on the environment and more on internal 
psychological states. Humanistic psychology (e.g., Maslow, 1970; Rogers, 
1961) may focus on conscious desires, whereas psychodynamic theories (e.g., 
Freud, 1969) may focus on non-conscious mechanisms. In any case, it is evident 
that, even before gathering data and even before any argumentation, scientists 
will adopt a specific point of departure and focus on a particular aspect of 
human behavior. Self-determination theory is no different. 
Self-determination theory adopts an organismic approach (Deci, 1980) to the 
study of human behavior, and more particularly to the study of human 
motivation. The assumption of the active organism is a point of departure 
shared by great theorists such as Piaget, Freud, Jung, Maslow, and Rogers (see 
Ryan, 1995). Under this assumption, human beings are considered active 
organisms, acting on their internal and external environments on the basis of 
internal structures that are constantly elaborated and refined with experience 
(Deci & Ryan, 1985). Offering a motivational account of behavior, self-
determination theory is preoccupied with the energy for the development of 
internal structures that human beings integrate into a unified, coherent structure 
of the self. This energy is referred to as intrinsic motivation. Think of babies and 
their interest in a wide array of stimuli, their effort to conquer challenges, or 
their tendency to connect to others. As they grow, their intrinsic motivation is 
channeled toward specific activities and people or is somehow thwarted and 
lost. Self-determination theory focuses both on the individual and on the 
environment in order to understand how intrinsic motivation can be supported. 
 
 2.3. Self-determination theory is a theory about autonomy 
Intrinsic motivation manifests itself through the person’s engagement in inherently 
enjoyable or interesting activities. When people are intrinsically motivated, they 
experience enjoyment rather than pressure or tension. The activity is perceived 
as an end in itself, rather than as a means to an end. One of the questions that 
concerns SDT is how this can be undermined. Research has shown that external 
events, such as salient rewards, threats and deadlines, evaluation and surveillance, 
and lack of choice, consistently undermine people’s motivation to perform 
otherwise engaging activities, primarily due to the individuals’ interpretation 
that the contextual factors, instead of the individuals themselves, are the 
initiators of behavior (Deci & Ryan, 1987). Autonomy is, of course, a 
theoretical concept that is used to describe what is undermined by these 
contextual factors, but the empirical consequences are there; they are real. 
The experience of self-determination has empirical, measurable properties that 
are considered intertwined but may be studied in isolation: perceived choice, 
volition, and internal perceived locus of causality (Reeve, Nix and Hamm, 2003). 
Perceived choice refers to a subjective feeling of choice while performing an 
activity instead of an objective number of other options, volition to “a sense of 
unpressured willingness to engage in the activity” (Deci, Ryan, & Williams, 
1996, p.165), and the internal perceived locus of causality to the subjective 
perception that a person is an origin of her behavior instead of a pawn (De 
Charms, 1968). In all cases, the focus is on the experience of the individual 
rather than some objective  outside 
criterion. With regard to choice, for example, an infinite number of options may 
seem tyrannical (Schwartz, 2000) or a controlled choice can be ego-depleting 
(Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006). Self-determination theory will emphasize 
 
 
autonomous choice, that is, the experience of choice combined with an internal 
perceived locus of causality. Specific measures have been developed that tap 
into different aspects of self-determination and help us make sense of empirical 
data and human behavior. 
Autonomy support has clear implications in areas besides the strict realm of 
intrinsic motivation. It facilitates creativity, cognitive flexibility, positive emotional 
tone, and maintenance of behavior change (Deci & Ryan, 1987). More importantly, 
it is linked to eudaimonic well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2001). We may understand 
more about how this is possible if we take into account that autonomy support is 
not only valuable for intrinsically motivating activities but is also a clear facilitator 
for the process of internalization. 
The majority of the activities that we engage in are not inherently enjoyable 
or satisfying. Therefore, there must be other reasons for why we perform them 
and these are classified along a continuum of autonomy, illustrating different 
degrees of internalization. By definition, activities that are performed for reasons 
other than the activity itself are considered to be extrinsically motivated. Not all 
extrinsically motivated activities have the same properties, though. Intuitively, we 
understand that it is different to perform an activity in order to attain an external 
reward than to uphold values that are personally important to us. Organismic 
integration theory, one of the mini-theories that comprises self-determination 
theory, has produced a taxonomy of human motivation on the basis of the way in 
which different motives relate to the phenomenal core we call the self. It 
proposes six distinct categories of regulation of an activity: amotivation, where 
there is lack of intention to act, external regulation, where there is salience of 
rewards and punishments, introjected regulation, where there is focus on 
approval by self or others and feelings such as guilt and pride dominate, 
 identified regulation, where there is self-endorsement of a goal, integrated 
regulation, where there is synthesis and congruence with a broader system of 
goals and values, and intrinsic regulation, where there is interest and enjoyment 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). Only the latter 
three forms of motivation are considered autonomous. Special emphasis is often 
given to introjected regulation, where there is no particular external contingency 
present. People are instead regulated by an inner control, giving the impression 
that the regulatory process and the person regulated are separate (Deci, Eghrari, 
Patrick, & Leone, 1994). 
Ryan and Connell (1989) have confirmed the idea that the motivational 
formulation outlined above lies along a continuum of relative autonomy. They 
found that external regulation was associated with less interest and value and that 
introjected regulation was linked to greater anxiety and reduced coping with 
failure. On the other hand, identified regulation was associated with more 
enjoyment of life and positive coping styles. The more people move toward 
more autonomous forms of motivation, such as integrated regulation (Deci et 
al., 1994), the more they experience an extrinsically motivated activity in a 
similar manner to intrinsically motivated activities, even though the activity is 
still performed to attain a separable outcome—rather than being an end in itself. 
 
2.4. Self-determination theory is not only a theory about autonomy 
One of the most important questions that self-determination theory asks is how it 
is possible for people to move toward more autonomous types of motivation. Is it 
simply the absence of rewards and punishments that supports intrinsic motivation 
and facilitates internalization? In fact, the answer is much more complicated. Self- 
 
 
determination theory identifies three needs as essential nutriments for growth and 
integrity: autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Autonomy 
refers to the need to self-organize and regulate one’s own behavior, 
competence refers to the need to seek optimal challenges and achieve effectance 
in one’s environment, and relatedness refers to the need to have intimacy and 
connectedness. The absence of threats, deadlines, rewards, or punishment may 
indeed facilitate autonomous regulation, but this factor is related only to the 
need for autonomy. Competence is also important. People’s intrinsic tendencies 
will be supported by offering optimal challenges and informational feedback that 
will help people grow and master those challenges—in general, to enhance their 
feeling of competence. Informational feedback is contrasted with controlling 
feedback that ego-involves people, that is, makes their self-esteem contingent on 
the achievement of particular outcomes and undermines autonomous regulation 
(Ryan, 1982). Apart from competence, which plays a central role in 
autonomous motivation, relatedness plays a more distal role that, when satisfied, 
serves as a backdrop for autonomous behavior (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
If we view behavior as the result of an interactive process between the self 
and the environment, self-authored behavior is initiated by the self and not by 
the environment. Under an organismic approach, the self internalizes aspects of 
the environment, often integrating them fully, thus making a pure dichotomy 
between self and environment impossible. We, therefore, must rely more on the 
subjective experiential qualities of behavior than on crude “objective” distinctions. 
Any external event is evaluated according to its “functional significance” (Deci 
& Ryan, 1985), that is, according to the psychological meaning a person gives to 
that event and may be treated as facilitating or restrictive of self-authorship. On 
the other hand, it should be noted that even internal events, such as spontaneous 
 thoughts, may be evaluated as restrictive of self-authorship if they build on 
introjects and guilt or contingent self-esteem. The “self ” of self-determination 
theory does not refer to the person in general but more specifically to the 
phenomenal ego-center that regulates human behavior (Pfander, 1908/1967). 
Therefore, it is next to impossible to ascertain self-authorship by a simple 
internal–external event distinction, unless we understand how people give 
meaning both to internal and external events. 
At the same time, each organism is different and incorporates different aspects 
of the environment. This raises the question of whether any type of behavior might 
be regarded as autonomous or self-authored—thus introducing a high degree of 
relativity in the concept of self-authorship. Self-determination theory supports 
the idea that the process of internalization and intrinsic motivation lies on the 
same global principles, namely the satisfaction of the three psychological needs. 
Environments that support these basic nutriments for growth and integrity will 
in the end support the individuals’ intrinsic tendencies to behave in effective and 
healthy ways. In the end, self-determination theory offers specific and global 
guidelines for how an environment should be structured. 
  
3. Self-authorship is not independence 
There is a strong intuition, especially in autonomy-supporting cultures, in favor 
of independence and freedom as something of intrinsic value. Outlaws like Jesse 
James and his brothers became “great American action heroes” (Robinson, 2007, 
p. 55), simply because they appeared to be utterly free: James was not free in a 
legal or political sense but rather in a pre-political or “primitive” sense (Williams, 
2001). Given that James lived a life of crime and violence and was betrayed and 
executed by a member of his gang at age 34, it is not immediately evident how this 
unlimited freedom contributed to a good life. Regardless of how highly James 
valued his “primitive freedom” and other elements of his life, he may have 
conceded that his was a short and stressful life with a premature ending. In any 
case, we should evaluate freedom less in terms of a general objective principle of 
freedom and more in terms of the subjective experiential properties of autonomy. 
It is there that we will discover the intrinsic value of freedom. 
Autonomy is sometimes construed as a right to rule oneself—a view that 
accounts for the original meaning of the term (from the Greek word αυτονομία: 
αυτό = self and νόμος = rule). In this context, autonomy is a strong negative right 
to non-interference. In Nozick’s defense of self-ownership, respect for certain 
rights is linked to autonomy as an exercise concept (Nozick, 1974). Joel Feinberg 
argues for a right to personal sovereignty, which he compares to state sovereignty. 
But then he goes on to explain, through a thorough examination of the 
boundaries of personal sovereignty, that people need some “breathing space 
around 
[their] body, analogous perhaps to offshore fishing rights in the national model” 
(Feinberg, 1986, pp. 47–48). This space is invaded, according to Feinberg, by even 
 the slightest interference, just like a state’s sovereignty is under attack even when a 
small fishing boat enters its waters without permission. But if this breathing space 
is important enough for personal autonomy to warrant this kind of protection, 
we cannot turn a blind eye on what makes this notion worth its salt. In other 
words, we should better understand the object of this protection. A person, a 
homeless beggar for example, can have full personal sovereignty rights to protect 
her breathing space and yet have no breathing space at all. The same applies to 
understandings of personal sovereignty based on every individual’s right not to 
have her powers usurped by another (Ripstein, 2006): it is of paramount 
importance for personal autonomy that people have adequate powers to control 
their lives; if they do not, any negative right, no matter how strong, will not tell 
the whole story of autonomous living. 
Many philosophical discussions of autonomy see independence as a core 
element of autonomy. Interestingly, this includes theories of autonomy that fully 
recognize the significance of other factors, such as the availability of options and 
opportunities (Colburn, 2011; Raz, 1986; Wall, 1998). From a self-determination 
theory perspective, a simple absence of interference or dependence would not 
necessarily characterize self-authorship. Indeed, individuals may willingly and 
autonomously seek dependence. Autonomy, therefore, should not be equated 
with the absence of external influences but rather with the assent to those 
influences (Ryan & Deci, 2006). For instance, one cannot envision a successful 
close relationship on the basis of detachment, but rather only on the basis of 
volitional intimacy, connectedness, and interdependence (Patrick, Knee, 
Canevello, & Lonsbary, 2007). Even within interdependent cultures, the need 
for autonomy will be valued without necessarily endorsing individualism, self-
reliance, or independence (Chirkov, 2009; Chirkov, Ryan, & Willness, 2005). 
 Moreover, prosocial behavior has been found to yield benefits for the helper 
when performed autonomously and to add to well-being through need 
satisfaction (Ryan, Curren, & Deci, 2013; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). These 
points draw a more realistic image of the autonomous person, as they account 
for the “social aspect” of the options commonly available to people (Raz, 1986; 
Wall, 1998). In light of the preceding discussion, it is evident that philosophical 
accounts of self-authorship have room for considerations regarding the impact 
of our social and cultural environment on the appeal of the choices available to 
us. Self-determination theory can detach these considerations from an overly 
rigid understanding of the autonomous person as someone who should, as a 
matter of principle, be resistant to external stimuli that undermine her freedom. 
In fact, resistance to interpersonal influence, otherwise labeled “reactive 
autonomy,” should not be considered real autonomy, whereas “reflective 
autonomy” captures the essence of the concept (Koestner & Losier, 1996). The 
idea is also implicit in some discussions of self-authorship that acknowledge 
the impact of the social aspect of options and will be analyzed further. This 
discussion allows us to look into the reasons for making a specific choice and to 
view the environment as a component of people’s autonomous living. 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. Self-authorship and positive freedom—Qualifications for 
autonomy support 
Joseph Raz describes personal autonomy as follows: “autonomy is opposed to a life 
of coerced choices. It contrasts with a life of no choices, or of drifting through life 
without ever exercising one’s capacity to choose” (Raz, 1986, p. 371). He explains 
that “the autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life” and that “the ideal 
of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their 
own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives” 
(Raz, 1986, p. 369). This is a very common understanding of personal autonomy 
in political philosophy. Most prominent liberals, including many we commonly 
regard as proponents of negative liberty, would not reject the core of Raz’s 
description. Rawls, for example, discusses the idea that a person’s good is 
determined by what he understands as his rational long-term plans. He goes as 
far as to say that, after all, “a person may be regarded as a human life lived 
according to a plan” (Rawls, 1971, pp. 92–93). In a similar vein, Nozick argues 
that a person must be able to formulate long-term plans and act in accordance 
with abstract principles and a general picture of what an appropriate life is 
because “only a being with the capacity to so shape his life can have or strive for a 
meaningful life” (Nozick, 1974, pp. 49–50). Self-determination theory would 
further extend this reasoning and suggest that intrinsic goals, such as affiliation, 
helpfulness, health, and growth, are more likely to serve the organism’s intrinsic 
tendencies than extrinsic goals such as fame, money, and appealing appearance 
(Kasser & Ryan, 1996). 
This is the core idea of self-authorship: a life in accordance with the principles, 
values, and choices of the person whose life it is. It requires freedom from undue 
 external interference (negative freedom) but, more importantly, it requires actively 
making autonomous choices (positive freedom). A possible qualification for this 
kind of life is the mental capacity for adopting principles, endorsing values, and 
making choices. This capacity is described as a kind of “minimum rationality, the 
ability to comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the mental faculties 
necessary to plan actions, etc.” (Raz, 1986, p. 373). Rationality could be seen as a 
necessary condition for the enjoyment of autonomy (Feinberg, 1986). On the level 
of individual differences, there are people with an autonomous orientation (see 
Deci & Ryan, 1985) who will tend to seek out opportunities for autonomous 
behavior. This is not so much a matter of mental capacity as it is of cognitive 
flexibility and choiceful accommodation of environmental events, although it is 
true that the selection of self-concordant goals can be a difficult self-perceptual 
task (Sheldon, 2014). It is also important to note that no one exhibits 
autonomous motivation and self-authorship all the time, even though people 
with an autonomy orientation will tend to interpret environmental contingencies 
as autonomy-supportive. Autonomous motivation will also vary with the activity 
or the action that is under question. Some activities may be self-authored and 
some may not, depending on the level of internalization or the existence of 
intrinsic motivation. This in turn varies with the extent of satisfaction of the three 
psychological needs with regard to the activity or its broader context. In fact, all 
factors may co-determine the degree of self-authorship. For example, Hagger 
and Chatzisarantis (2011) found that people with an autonomy orientation are 
“protected” by the undermining effect of rewards on intrinsic motivation. It is 
not, therefore, easy to isolate properties of the individual that are necessary for 
the enactment of positive freedom, but there seems to be some type of individual 
capacity that relates to general motivational tendencies. This individual 
 capacity, the autonomy causality orientation, should be nurtured, especially in 
the early formative years of development, through the satisfaction of the basic 
psychological needs. 
At the same time, there is a natural, almost self-evident appeal to the view that 
autonomy is impossible in the absence of certain environmental basic goods— 
namely, life, bodily health, and integrity. The autonomous person is not one 
“always struggling to maintain the minimum conditions of a worthwhile life” 
(Raz, 1986, p. 155). In terms of both moral argument and public policy, it is 
particularly important that, on this account, extreme material deprivation can 
undermine autonomy as much as coercion and manipulation (Waldron,   
1989).Maslow (1943) also proposes a sequential structure of needs on the basis 
of a pyramid with successive stages that the individual goes through on the 
path to self-actualization. He distinguishes among five types of needs: 
physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, and the need for 
self-actualization. One cannot move to the next stage without satisfaction of the 
needs of the previous stage. This hierarchical view of needs is different to the 
way SDT conceptualizes the three growth-oriented basic psychological needs 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000). Maslow (1943) further recognizes that there are 
prerequisites to need satisfaction, such as freedom to express oneself and 
freedom to do as one wishes, as well as desires for exploration which he did not 
identify as needs per se. Self-determination theory also underscores the 
centrality of these concepts, which it includes in its conceptualization of needs, 
and further views basic needs as the necessary conditions of well-being, 
integrity, and growth. Self-determination theory regards them as significant in 
all stages of development without offering any prerequisites or end- points (Deci 
& Ryan, 2000). These psychological needs are significant across the life span of 
 the individual (Ryan, Deci, Grolnick, & La Guardia, 2006). Through the lens of 
SDT, we are able to understand how severe deprivation of certain goods 
undermines well-being, integrity, and growth by undercutting the ability to 
engage in meaningful relationships, achieve effectance in one’s environment, 
and autonomously pursue one’s life path. 
There is also little controversy in the statement that self-authorship requires 
the availability of options. Unless we have enough options to choose from, we 
cannot lead autonomous lives. This is a rather common theme in contemporary 
legal and political philosophy. Raz gives considerable attention to the point that 
we cannot be autonomous unless we have an adequate range of options to choose 
from. Kymlicka (1991) also emphasizes the importance of enjoying a significant 
range of options in his discussion of freely chosen activities and their value. The 
availability of options is a central concern for those theorists whose explorations 
go beyond an understanding of autonomy as a mere capacity. Whether their 
interest primarily lies in freedom (Cohen, 1995) or in well-being, most of them 
recognize that autonomy requires options (Hurka, 1993; Sher, 1997; Wall, 1998). 
While, however, there is much intuitive appeal to the adequacy of options as a 
condition of autonomy, due, in part, to its allegiance to value-pluralism, there is 
also much vagueness. Sher (1997) appreciates Raz’s point but cannot overlook the 
obvious question: Which options are adequate? The answer to this question will 
also be (perhaps inevitably) open to the criticism of vagueness, but it can reveal 
enough about the condition of “having adequate options” to reaffirm the view that 
a full-blooded account of personal autonomy transcends the distinction between 
negative and positive liberty. 
According to self-determination theory, autonomous behavior is 
characterized by genuine choice, where a person is able to truly entertain other 
 options. In this sense, a behavior is genuinely chosen when other options were—
or could have been—entertained (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Under coercion, an 
individual will probably experience a low sense of choice. Manipulation, a 
practice that distorts the way we see our options (Raz, 1986) and the way in which 
we make choices, may also be devastating for autonomy. The same may be said if 
behavior is only partially internalized and spurred by introjects—in introjected 
regulation. We must keep in mind that people do not author their lives by 
having adequate options, but rather by making specific choices (Kalliris, 2015). 
Activities that are the product of coercion, manipulation, or even those that are 
regulated though introjection (therefore, with no apparent environmental 
intervention) will be perceived as controlling events and the individual will feel 
compelled to act in a certain way. In that case, the presence of options, as many 
or diverse as they may be, will not provoke a high sense of choice. It is not correct 
to concentrate exclusively on which objective number of options could instigate a 
high sense of choice since the result is always the product of interaction between 
the individual and multiple aspects of the environment. The environment alone 
cannot guarantee a high sense of choice. However, this does not mean that 
positive interventions are not possible. The focus should be on offering options 
in a non-controlling way, which should enhance rather than undermine 
autonomy. 
Take, for example, the choice of becoming a surgeon. The option of becoming a 
surgeon may hold different social meanings, a point that is made by philosophers 
who appreciate the so-called “social aspect” of choices (Raz, 1986; Wall, 1998). 
A surgeon is not merely a person who heals others—the same can be said about 
a shaman or a healer in a pre-modern community. Part of the appeal of this 
profession stems from factors that are not directly relevant to the option itself, 
 but rather to the social meanings it has acquired. The reasons that make some 
people choose a surgeon’s career are not limited to the healing itself, but may 
very well include social status, financial reward, career prospects, research 
opportunities, community contribution, personal growth potential, and physical 
health. Self-determination theory shows that attainment of extrinsic goals 
(money, fame, or image) correlates positively with ill-being, whereas only the 
attainment of intrinsic goals (personal growth, community involvement, close 
relationships, or physical health) correlates positively with well-being. Most 
importantly, the relationship between change in the attainment of intrinsic goals 
and change in well-being is mediated by the fulfillment of the basic 
psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Niemiec, Ryan, 
& Deci, 2009). As repeatedly found in research within SDT, it is the satisfaction 
of these needs, and not the attainment of goals per se, that allows the expression 
of intrinsic tendencies, the integration of aspects of the environment, and the 
enhancement of well-being. Undoubtedly, offering the option of becoming a 
surgeon is important. At the same time, the way the option is offered has an 
impact on the well-being of the person, alongside other factors, such as individual 
life goals, causality orientations, and capacity for mindfulness (see Ryan, Huta & 
Deci, 2008). Even though achieving eudaimonic wellness is indeed complicated, 
it can be argued that the more the option is offered with support for autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness, the greater the chances that the choice made will 
lead to self-authorship and the good life. 
A last, but important, point on the significance of options should be made 
here. The fact that options have a “social meaning” and that many of them are not 
only shaped but, in fact, provided by societies and governments does not entail 
that individuals simply choose among options provided by others. As long as we 
 adopt an interactive approach in the study of human behavior, we are bound to 
point out that individuals can also create options for themselves. Therefore, with 
regard to policy, the state may provide options directly or may indirectly provide 
the nutriments for the individual to create options. As long as individuals hold 
intrinsic aspirations, and are mindful and autonomy oriented, they will be able 
to entertain innovative options in the absence of direct environmental support. 
Institutions, schools, and laws should aim at helping people pursue their intrinsic 
tendencies, especially during early developmental stages, so that they will be able 
to make self-endorsed choices, even when the environment is not supportive 
enough. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. Law and policy implications 
It is, by now, evident that self-determination theory views behavior as the result of 
the interaction between person and environment. It is difficult to define the exact 
prerequisites of self-authorship without taking into account all relevant factors. 
Law and policy interventions can only shape a small part of the environment and 
cannot therefore guarantee self-authorship for the citizens. However, state 
interventions should at least be aimed in the right direction. Whatever supports 
the needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness is a probable facilitator of 
both intrinsic motivation and processes of internalization—in the end, of well-
being and the good life. 
The statement that the law can facilitate the conditions for autonomous living 
and the satisfaction of needs like competence and relatedness is not 
uncontroversial. As already mentioned, there is a long and influential liberal 
tradition that seeks to describe the limits of the law—especially criminal law—in 
terms  of several variations of the Millian harm principle. Within this tradition, 
liberal perfectionists are especially concerned with self-authorship as a 
fundamentally valuable exercise and a necessary component of well-being. 
However, law is more often than not seen as a threat to autonomy. Many liberal 
neutralists, while appreciating the value of self-authorship, are opposed to the 
(even non-coercive) promotion of any comprehensive account of well-being by 
the state. Interestingly, even neutralism is currently under attack by theorists who 
believe that since consensus on values and lifestyles is an unrealistic approach, 
and reasonable people continue to disagree on the most fundamental issues, all 
we can hope for is not political neutrality, but rather a modus vivendi (Gray, 
2000). Of course, there is no guarantee that this “second best,” which will 
simply aspire to maintain peace and security (Horton, 2010), will have plenty 
 of room for autonomy or look anything like modern liberal communities. Modus 
vivendi theories fuel a growing concern among those who believe that the good 
life differs from person to person that our political institutions (including the 
law, as one of the most far-reaching) are instruments of oppression rather than 
supportive of self-authorship. 
Clearly, a comprehensive account of liberalism based on self-authorship (in 
other words, “liberal perfectionism”) is not committed to political neutrality. If 
autonomy is valuable, either intrinsically or as a component of the good life (or 
both), it makes sense for the liberal state to protect and promote it. Regardless of 
one’s understanding of autonomy, there are certain criteria that must be set to any 
autonomy-promoting state intervention. Firstly, it cannot be self-defeating: if the 
intervention is likely to result in less autonomy or well-being for those who are 
subject to it, it is not justified. Secondly, it must take into account the principle of 
equal concern for persons, allocating resources in a manner that does not 
consistently favor particular social groups. Inequality, especially with regard to 
access to opportunities rather than access to outcomes, can consistently 
undermine basic psychological needs (Ryan & Deci, 2017). When these two 
conditions are met (conditions which are, of course, susceptible to abuse), a 
liberal perfectionist state can implement policies and pass legislation that 
support the ideal and exercise of autonomy and self-authorship. 
Interventions on the basis of an SDT view of self-authorship should be clearly 
distinguished from the usual “liberal” policy prescriptions. On the one hand, 
liberals who advocate political neutrality toward various conceptions of the good 
life would be unable to support policies that clearly favor self-authorship, even 
in its revised form defended here. All the state can do under conditions of liberal 
neutrality is commit to a thick account of self-respect and allow people to pursue 
 their idea of a good life (Rawls, 2001). On the other hand, those who subscribe 
to a comprehensive account of autonomy as self-authorship (the so-called liberal 
perfectionists) speak, as we have seen, of rationality and a good understanding 
of the world as conditions of autonomy (and good living) but concede that what 
they defend is a particular way of life. An SDT-based policy intervention would 
not favor a particular way of life nor would it simply leave room for people to 
engage in their life path with no support: its purpose would be to offer the proper 
nutriments for people to grow and follow their intrinsic tendencies. 
At the same time, general pro-autonomy measures are conceptually elusive: 
for example, what are the principles of pro-autonomy education and what should 
the curriculum of an autonomy-supporting school look like? Those who make 
more focused policy recommendations (like a comprehensive education that 
promotes autonomy) are quick to concede that their proposals may be 
controversial (Colburn, 2011). Proposals based on the SDT-inspired account 
provided here are limited neither by a commitment to state neutrality nor by a 
commitment   to any particular way of life. For example, SDT would not 
necessarily favor a particular type of school reform but would stress how it 
should be implemented: ideally, in a way representing the values and the ideas 
of the people involved, focusing on internalization, and on basic need 
satisfaction of school personnel (Assor, Kaplan, Feinberg, & Tal, 2009). This 
type of comprehensive reform has been successfully tested in Israel by Feinberg, 
Assor, Kaplan and Kanat-Maymon (2006). If there is not enough time or 
resources for such a comprehensive reform, there are SDT-based structural 
reforms such as “First Things First,” developed by James P. Connell and 
associates that emphasize small learning communities, a family and student 
advocate system, and instructional improvement (see Deci, 2009 for a 
 description). In any case, the focus is on procedures that allow basic need 
satisfaction and endorsement of resultant policies. 
Similarly, SDT can help choose among different policy suggestions and clarify 
the role legal provisions are expected to play in an autonomy-supporting culture. 
The law is the instrument by which states resolve conflicts, maintain the peace, 
and promote goodness. An SDT-based account of self-authorship can provide  
a clear guide for policies that commonly fuel heated debates and social conflict. 
For example, there are clearly defined groups in otherwise autonomy-oriented 
societies that regard freedom as detrimental or even hostile to their members’ 
well-being. This is true for various religious groups, as evidenced by Wisconsin 
v. Yoder (1972), a famous US Supreme Court case that examined the right of the 
Amish not to attend school after a certain age. These groups are confident that 
their ways of life are valuable and view any freedom-promoting intervention as 
an expression of inadequate respect for their choices and, in fact, equal standing 
in their society. Self-determination theory passes no judgment on these ways of 
life per se. However, the evidence in favor of basic need support in education is 
overwhelming and the state should ensure that all citizens enjoy the opportunity 
to develop the properties that can help them satisfy their needs and lead good 
lives. This does not mean that options can be imposed, but merely that they can 
only be offered to the citizens. Otherwise, they will be perceived as controlling 
and are less likely to be self-endorsed. The life children choose after their initial 
need-supportive training is no business of the state, even if it is a life with very 
little freedom. Even such a life can be self-endorsed and self-authored. 
Similar conflicts arise when people’s opinions on what an autonomy-
respecting government should do in a particular area of public policy are 
incompatible. School curriculum, subsidies, government campaigning, and the 
 allocation of resources and infrastructure are some of these areas. Should our 
children be taught about evolution, creationism, or both? Should the church 
(any church) be funded by the state? Should we subsidize art instead of more 
popular forms of entertainment? Is bombarding people with messages about the 
benefits of sports, education, and healthy eating justified? There is little chance 
of agreeing on any of these issues without a solid understanding of what 
promotes self-authorship and how. Every policy that undermines autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness is a prima facie bad idea. Any policy that does not 
allow citizens a sense of initiative, volition, and ownership, any policy that is 
not perceived as a  reflection of their ideas and values, that seems extremely 
difficult for them to implement, or that undermines their web of meaningful 
relationships is bound to fail. Of course, autonomy and well-being are not the 
only legitimate considerations of any government. But if a policy is autonomy-
restricting and harmful for personal well-being, a special justification is 
required. So, SDT proposes a shift of focus: instead of discussing conflicting 
values and ways of life with very little chance of ever reaching consensus, the 
state ought to resolve these conflicts by reference to their effects on basic need 
support. Relative to this discussion is the SDT-informed understanding of theories 
of well-being with a strong focus on autonomy, such as the capabilities approach 
(Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 2009), which has already been found to contribute to 
well-being through basic need satisfaction (DeHaan, Hirai, & Ryan, 2016). 
Promoting the intrinsic tendencies of the individual may sound like placing too 
much faith in the individual. The image of the perfectly rational human being is 
increasingly under fire, especially in light of the work of many behavioral scientists 
who have convincingly shown that human decision-making is undermined by 
biases and heuristics (Ariely, 2009; Kahneman, 2012; Thaler, 2015). Were it not for 
 the coercive threat of a fine or another sanction, many of us would drive without 
fastening our seatbelts or wearing helmets, enter a worksite without protective 
gear, buy and use dangerous substances, and so on. These may be actions that, if 
reflected upon, would not often be endorsed by individuals and would therefore 
be considered heteronomous (Ryan & Deci, 2006). In all these cases, the role of 
the law becomes particularly important since public policy and welfare (and, quite 
often, paternalistic) measures are normally implemented through legislation. The 
main point in these discussions is freedom: coercion restricts freedom and, 
therefore, we should either justify the coercive interference with reasons that 
override our commitment to freedom or introduce alternative measures. 
Libertarian paternalism emerged as a middle-ground answer to this conflict, 
offering an allegedly freedom-compatible way of making people behave in 
accordance with their own interests (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Self-determination 
theory conversely suggests that the appropriate central question in this debate is 
“how is autonomy affected?” If a policy undermines, by exploiting our biases, 
our ability to make decisions for ourselves and internalize our options, it is a 
prima facie bad policy, even if our freedom (e.g., our freedom of choice) does 
not visibly suffer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6. A note on paternalism and perfectionism 
The preceding analysis suggests that we should reconsider the role of law in the 
protection and promotion of personal well-being. Legal paternalism has 
traditionally been understood as a conflict between well-being and freedom. This 
is mainly due to its coercive approach, which normally takes the form of a threat: 
“If you do not do X, which is good for you, you will suffer Y, which is something 
unpleasant that would not otherwise occur.” This has led many theorists to the   
conclusion that it must be freedom that suffers from paternalistic interventions. 
Arguments in support of this view rely on several descriptions of freedom, 
including “liberty of action” (Dworkin, 1979), freedom as the non-restriction of 
options (Kleinig, 1983), and freedom as the unobstructed exercise of decision-
making (Clarke, 2002). The SDT account of self-authorship sheds some light 
on what is wrong with both paternalism itself and the efforts to explain it in 
terms of a restriction of freedom. Paternalism is problematic because it 
undermines self-authorship and can, especially when it is coercive, thwart our 
needs of autonomy, relatedness, and competence. 
Moreover, contrary to the teachings of libertarian paternalism, taking coercion 
out of the picture is not enough because it is self-authorship and not freedom or 
liberty of action or the non-restriction of options (i.e., “free choice”) that is at stake 
when the paternalist intervenes. These points do a lot of work in the direction of 
explaining why people resent paternalistic interventions that target their religion, 
political activity, or personal life. On the contrary, in some cases of welfare 
paternalism (i.e., paternalism that seeks to protect us from physical injury or 
extreme risk), we may discover that individuals endorse the goals of the 
paternalistic law and this explains why the reactions against these laws are rare. 
 Self-authorship, then, does not exclude a priori any kind of paternalism: a mild 
intervention that does not affect more options than the one it explicitly targets 
and contributes to the exercise of a behavior that is or is very likely to be 
endorsed by the individual can be compatible with self-authorship, especially 
when it incorporates an informative/learning element that makes future 
interventions less likely. After all, it is not complete lack of external influence 
but the assent to that influence that is the basic criterion for an SDT account of 
autonomous behavior (Ryan & Deci, 2006). 
Self-determination theory supports a perfectionist scheme of political action 
in the sense that it has a view of what constitutes a good life and offers arguments 
for state policies in the service of autonomy, relatedness, and competence. In 
rejecting political neutrality and acknowledging the importance of respect for 
value pluralism, our analysis shares some characteristics with liberal 
perfectionism. According to an SDT-based self-authorship theory, there is a lot 
to be said and to be implemented in the area of the non-coercive promotion of 
the good life. Education, state campaigning, and subsidies are some of the ways 
in which the state can help individuals in their effort to satisfy their needs and 
live well. However, our analysis goes well beyond liberal perfectionism in 
suggesting that ruling out coercion is not enough for securing autonomy. Many 
non-coercive measures, including manipulative messages, rewards, and the 
usurpation of people’s decision-making by exploiting their biases, can be 
equally threatening to autonomy and self-authorship. 
In the end, the psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
can provide a guide for understanding self-authorship and the ways in which 
government can constructively support it. As long as it is accepted that 
psychological experiences are the regnant causes of well-being (Deci & Ryan, 
 2011), the proper level of analysis is the one adopted in this paper. At the same 
time, it should be stressed that self-determination theory is still a work in 
progress and the implementation in the areas of law and public policy will require 
both empirical research as well as theoretical advancement. Psychology has not 
been widely accepted and used as a tool for general policy-making but, in the 
future, self-determination theory can provide a solid basis for understanding 
self-authorship and devising appropriate policy prescriptions. 
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